Belgium’s Resistance to Seizing Russian Assets Exposes Europe’s Biggest Strategic Gamble

Belgium’s hesitation over a European Union plan to seize nearly €200 billion in frozen Russian assets is not a narrow legal dispute or a small-country wobble. It is the moment where Europe’s moral imperative collides head-on with the hard limits of its economic model, legal norms, and security vulnerabilities. What looks like a technical debate about Euroclear and sanctions is, in reality, a stress test of how far the EU is willing – and able – to go in turning its financial power into a weapon of war.

Why this fight matters far beyond Brussels

The EU is attempting something unprecedented: converting frozen sovereign and private Russian assets into a long-term funding stream for Ukraine’s war effort and reconstruction. The sums are enormous – roughly €197 billion in Russian assets held at Euroclear in Belgium alone – and Ukraine’s need is immediate, with its budget support projected to run dry in April.

Belgium, host to Euroclear and seat of key EU institutions, is pushing back on two fronts:

Security risk: Fear that outright seizure could be treated by Moscow as a casus belli, prompting retaliation against Belgian interests via cyber, sabotage, or hybrid attacks.
Financial and legal risk: Concern that Belgium and Euroclear could be left holding the bill if a future settlement with Russia obliges the EU to return seized funds or pay compensation.

The outcome will set precedents that go well beyond Russia and Ukraine. It will shape how safe foreign central banks and sovereign funds feel using Europe’s financial infrastructure, how credible EU sanctions are in the next global crisis, and whether the EU can marshal its economic strength without undermining the very trust that makes that strength possible.

The bigger picture: From sanctions to asset expropriation

Freezing foreign state assets is not new. Seizing them and repurposing them – especially on this scale – is. Historically, Western states have generally treated asset freezes as leverage, not expropriation:

Iran: After the 1979 revolution, the US froze Iranian assets, but ultimately returned or settled many claims via the Iran–US Claims Tribunal.
Iraq & Kuwait (1990s): Some Iraqi assets were used for UN-administered reparations after the invasion of Kuwait, but this occurred under a clear UN Security Council framework, not purely Western initiative.
Afghanistan (post-2021): The US has frozen central bank assets, with debates ongoing about partial use for humanitarian purposes and victims of terrorism – but outright permanent confiscation remains heavily contested.

Russia’s case is different in two critical ways:

The scale of the assets – over €260 billion in Russian central bank reserves frozen globally, a large share sitting in the EU, much of it at Euroclear.
The legal and political vacuum – there is no UN Security Council mandate for reparations, because Russia holds a veto. That forces the EU into uncharted legal territory if it chooses seizure.

Belgium is at the center because of Euroclear’s unique role. As one of the world’s largest securities clearing houses, Euroclear holds and processes huge volumes of international financial assets. The Russian funds stuck there – and the interest they generate – have already become a key focus of EU deliberations.

Initially, the EU pursued a more cautious approach: skimming off the profits generated by frozen Russian assets rather than touching the principal. Now, under pressure to plug a growing Ukraine funding gap and amid political uncertainty in the United States, Brussels is flirting with a bolder move – mobilizing the principal itself as collateral or direct financing for Kyiv.

What this really means: Trust vs. power in the European financial system

At its core, Belgium’s resistance is about the collision between two pillars of the modern European project:

Europe as a safe custodian of global capital, anchored in rule of law, property rights, and predictable behavior.
Europe as a geopolitical actor willing to weaponize finance to respond to aggression and sustain an ally at war.

If Brussels crosses the line from freezing to outright confiscation, it risks weakening the first pillar in order to strengthen the second. That is why Belgium is demanding burden-sharing guarantees and legal safeguards: it doesn’t want to be the weak link that both Russia and future litigants target when the bill comes due.

Prime Minister Bart De Wever’s concerns are not just about Russian missiles or cyberattacks. They are about future lawsuits in international courts, claims by Russia or Russian entities, and even claims by third countries worried that their assets might be next. If Euroclear is sued or sanctioned in turn, which states backstop the losses? Will the EU collectively indemnify Belgium, or will the host country end up paying for a geopolitical decision made in Brussels and Berlin?

In that sense, Belgium is voicing out loud what many other capitals are thinking quietly: if the EU is going to weaponize a common financial infrastructure, then the risk must also be mutualized, not concentrated in one small host state.

Hybrid retaliation: Russia’s likely playbook

Russia has already telegraphed its intent to frame seizure as an escalation. Dmitry Medvedev’s warning that asset confiscation could be treated as a casus belli is meant less as a literal declaration of war and more as a strategic signal: there will be costs, and they may not look like conventional warfare.

Experts on so-called “gray zone warfare” expect that retaliation to unfold along several lines:

Cyber operations: Targeting financial market infrastructure (like Euroclear, SWIFT links, or Belgian banking networks), government systems, and critical infrastructure such as energy grids and ports.
Information warfare: Disinformation campaigns aimed at Belgian public opinion, stoking polarization, undermining trust in government, and amplifying narratives that cast Belgium as a pawn of Washington or Berlin.
Infrastructure sabotage: From undersea cable disruptions to potential arson or sabotage targeting logistics hubs, energy terminals, or communication nodes in and around Belgium – activities hard to attribute but highly disruptive.
Legal and financial countermeasures: Russian countersuits, selective default on obligations to European creditors, or targeted sanctions on European entities most involved in the seizure decision.

What makes Belgium particularly exposed is not its military weakness but its economic centrality – the concentration of sensitive infrastructure and institutions in a small territory. A well-timed disruption to Euroclear, Brussels-based EU institutions, or key energy assets could send a chill through European markets far beyond Belgium itself.

The legal frontier: Can the EU do this without breaking its own rules?

There are three legal questions that EU policymakers must answer – and which worry Belgium the most:

Is permanent confiscation of state assets lawful without a UN mandate?
Many international lawyers argue that sovereign immunity limits such moves, especially in the absence of a broad internationally recognized reparations framework. The counterargument is that Russia’s invasion is such a grave violation of international law that it justifies exceptional measures. The EU risks creating a practice that could be used by others in less clear-cut cases.
Is seizing private Russian assets compatible with EU property protections?
Even sanctioned oligarchs or companies have rights under EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights. Without individualized legal processes and clear links to wrongdoing, blanket confiscation could be struck down in court, exposing member states and Euroclear to compensation claims.
Can Euroclear be compelled to act without undermining its global role?
Euroclear operates on trust that assets held in custody will not be arbitrarily seized. If it is forced into confiscation, non-Western states – especially in the Global South – may diversify away from European custodians, accelerating a fragmentation of the global financial system.

The EU has so far tried to navigate these risks by focusing first on using the interest income on frozen assets rather than the principal. Belgium’s current standoff indicates that, from Brussels’ perspective, even this supposedly softer option carries non-trivial security and legal risks once you scale it up and politicize it as a “reparations loan.”

What’s being overlooked: US uncertainty and the EU’s coming leadership test

One underreported driver of the EU’s urgency is political volatility in Washington. With US support for Ukraine increasingly subject to domestic partisan fights and electoral cycles, EU leaders fear a scenario where American funding drops sharply just as Ukraine’s needs peak.

In that context, Russian assets are seen as a way to de-Americanize Ukraine’s financial survival and give Europe greater agency. But that aspiration also exposes a truth many European governments avoid saying explicitly: turning to Russian assets is partly a hedge against US unreliability, not just a moral claim against Russian aggression.

There is also a domestic political dimension in Belgium and other states: publics are wary of open-ended financial commitments to Ukraine just as cost-of-living pressures and energy transitions bite. Presenting support for Ukraine as coming from “Russia’s money” rather than taxpayers’ wallets is politically attractive. That makes the temptation to push legal boundaries greater – and the need for solid, transparent legal reasoning more urgent.

Looking ahead: Three plausible trajectories

Several scenarios could unfold from here:

Compromise on partial use and guarantees
The most likely near-term outcome is a deal where Belgium agrees to the plan under tight constraints: using only the profits on frozen assets (not the principal) for now, accompanied by an EU-wide indemnity mechanism that shares legal and financial risks if Russia sues or retaliates. This preserves some trust in the financial system while providing a politically marketable funding stream for Ukraine.
Hard pivot to Article 122 emergency powers
If Belgium still refuses, the European Commission could invoke Article 122 to bypass unanimity and adopt measures on the basis of a qualified majority. While legal, this would deepen political fractures and confirm to Moscow that EU internal unity is strained. It could also set a precedent for using emergency powers in highly political financial decisions.
Strategic pause and fallback to conventional budget support
If legal and political risks appear too large, EU leaders might opt for a slower, more legally cautious approach: continue freezing assets, use profits in limited ways, and rely more heavily on standard EU budget instruments and national contributions. This would disappoint Kyiv but preserve the long-term integrity of EU financial norms.

Whichever path is chosen will echo beyond Ukraine. China, Gulf states, and major emerging economies are watching closely. A decision seen as overtly political and weakly grounded in law could accelerate efforts to shift reserves and transactions away from European institutions – slowly eroding the EU’s leverage in future crises.

The bottom line

Belgium’s resistance is not an act of cowardice; it is a warning signal from the front lines of Europe’s financial power. Seizing Russian assets might be morally compelling and strategically tempting, but it sits at the edge of what the EU’s legal order and financial model can bear without lasting damage.

If the EU wants to turn frozen Russian money into a weapon in defense of Ukraine, it must also accept that it is putting its own status as a neutral, rules-based financial safe haven on the line. The way Belgium’s concerns are handled – with burden-sharing, clear legal justification, and serious protection against hybrid threats – will determine whether Europe emerges from this crisis as a stronger geopolitical actor or as a less trusted financial hub.

European Union News

Belgium’s Standoff Over Frozen Russian Assets: How One Small State Is Stress-Testing Europe’s Power